INTRODUCTION
Studies of several western welfare states have revealed considerable non-take-up of meanstested benefits. Because one of the central aims of such benefits is to provide a safety net for people in need, non-take-up often means that the welfare system fails to reach its objectives and that poverty is not alleviated for some people.
1 Thus, the extent of non-take-up can be an indicator of inefficiency of the welfare system. Furthermore, fluctuations and trends in benefit recipiency, and the related budgetary costs, are commonly interpreted as increases or decreases in the number of poor people. However, such changes can also be due to increases or decreases in the take-up rate. Understanding the causes of take-up can thus help us to explain and foresee variations in benefit recipiency and its associated costs. The existence of non-take-up also signals that decisions about economic matters may not be guided by economic motivations alone. The decisions to claim, or to abstain from, benefits are embedded in a social context -including interpersonal influences and social norms -so the issue of non-take-up is also of substantial sociological relevance.
The bulk of research about non-take-up has been carried out in Britain and the US, but during the past decade there has been increasing interest in the issue in other western countries, enhancing our understanding of how welfare state features can affect take-up dynamics. The
Australian welfare state resembles other Anglo-Saxon welfare states in several dimensions (see e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990 ), yet distinguishes itself by providing benefits almost exclusively after means tests. The more selective the welfare state, the more crucial take-up is for its efficiency. It is thus surprising that in Australia -a highly selective welfare state -the extent and causes of non-take-up of benefits have received almost no attention 2 . The explanation of this lack of research and debate can of course be that non-take-up is less of a problem than in other countries, but it can also be that it is just believed to be less prevalent or that the issue is simply not perceived as interesting. It is my aim here to explore the extent and causes of non-take-up in Australia.
The high degree of selectivity in Australia makes the study of non-take-up particularly relevant, but it also renders such study very complicated: A large number of means-tested 4 benefits cater for individuals in different situations, and benefits are given on the basis of complex and varied criteria. Due to data limitations, I will not be able to study the degree of non-take-up for the full range of benefits. Instead, I will estimate the take-up rate among people with very low assets and incomes, and present a detailed analysis of take-up and its determinants for one particular benefit, namely Parenting Payment.
WHY DO PEOPLE FAIL TO TAKE UP A MEANS-TESTED BENEFIT TO WHICH THEY ARE ENTITLED?
An individual's claiming decision can be conceptualised as a function of information and perceived benefits and costs. The most evident benefit is economic gain. An individual's perception of his or her economic situation before and after recipiency of the payment should be of fundamental importance. The higher the individual's benefit entitlement is, the stronger are the economic incentives to claim the benefit. Naturally, individuals will vary in their capacity to calculate their entitlement as well as in the value they put on economic gain, but the effect of the size of the economic gain from take-up should on average be positive. If the eligible individual can receive alternative economic help from another source (e.g. family or friends), the perceived need may be smaller and the propensity to claim subsequently lower.
Claiming a benefit can also lead to some economic transaction costs, for example, costs for travelling to the welfare agency or for obtaining copies of documents. Probably more important are the transaction costs in terms of time and labour required to make a claim:
normally, one has to visit an agency, and papers proving the economic situation have to be produced.
The stigma associated with the recipiency of many means-tested benefits may give rise to social as well as personal costs. In most western countries, norms prescribe that people should earn their own living, and there is a positive valuation of successful people. To claim a benefit can be conceived of as a deviation from the work norm and as a sign of failure. Thus, an individual may fear disapproval from others if it comes to their knowledge that he or she receives a benefit, and the expected economic gains from receiving a benefit may therefore be 5 outweighed by the expected social costs associated with benefit recipiency. If the stigma associated with a benefit decreases, the propensity to claim it in a given economic situation should increase.
To the extent that a norm against receiving means-tested benefits is internalised, an individual may also experience personal costs, or 'mental dissonance', from violating it. In this case, the constraint on action is internal and the individual will avoid violating the norm even when no one can find out about it (cf. Elster, 1989, p.119ff ). An individual could, for example, abstain from claiming a benefit because he/she feels that claiming it would represent a personal failure, or that it would lower his/her self-esteem. For similar reasons, people may decide not to claim a benefit because of the loss of integrity felt by being subject to assessments of eligibility.
Information about benefits can affect take-up through multiple mechanisms. Firstly, it is necessary to have basic information about a benefit's existence and where and how to claim it (see van Oorschot, 1995, chapter 6) . Furthermore, the degree of information one has about the benefit system can affect the perception of the probability of receiving a benefit and the expectations of different costs and benefits of claiming it. More information can also lead to lower transaction costs, because the more knowledge one has about the eligibility rules and the application procedure, the easier it is to claim the benefit. The search for more information can be costly in terms of time and effort. The complexity of the criteria for recipiency of a benefit and the accessibility of information can affect the knowledge about a benefit and the costs of gaining more knowledge (Corden, 1995) .
Not only the current (pre-and post-benefit) income, but also the expected future economic situation of the individual is likely to be of importance for take-up. If the individual has little hope of getting out of economic hardship by his/her own means, the expected duration of benefit recipiency is longer. The transaction and stigma costs of claiming are probably highest when starting to claim a benefit, and those who expect short-term benefit recipiency may feel that the costs outweigh the gains of claiming. It should also be easier to find alternative means of supporting oneself for a short period of time than for a long one. Non-claiming can also be caused by another type of long-term consideration: an individual may fear that a period of 6 benefit recipiency can make him/her less attractive in the labour market and thus decrease the chances of long-term economic recovery.
Thus, given eligibility and basic information about a benefit's existence, one can think of an individual's decision whether or not to claim as based on weighting the potential benefits of economic gain against the potential costs induced by benefit recipiency. Below I will briefly review research about factors related to the propensity of take-up and, when possible, interpret them in terms of costs, benefits and information.
THE EXTENT AND CAUSES OF TAKE-UP: PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Research about the degree of take-up of means-tested benefits has been rather extensive in the US (e.g. Ashenfelter,1983; Moffitt, 1983; Blank and Ruggles, 1996; Anderson and Meyer, 1997; Bollinger and David, 2001; and review in Currie, 2004) and in the UK (see reviews in Atkinson, 1989; Craig, 1991; Corden, 1995 and Currie, 2004) . The take-up estimates have varied over time and between benefits, but they normally indicate substantial non-take-up. In the USA, take-up of Aid for Dependent Children (AFDC) has been estimated at between 62 and 70 per cent in 1986 and 1987 (Blank and Ruggles, 1996) , and the US Unemployment
Insurance take-up has been estimated at 71 per cent in 1977-87 (Blank and Card, 1991 During the past decade there has been an upsurge of research on take-up in several other western countries. German researchers have found take-up rates of the means-tested
Sozialhilfe of around 40 per cent during the 1990's (Riphahn, 2001; Kayser and Frick, 2001 (SOU, 1999; Gustafsson, 1987; . The apparent differences between countries may reflect quality of data and research design as well as actual differences between countries and the programs considered. It is also important to note that there should always be some frictional non-take-up, because there is normally some time lag between eligibility and claiming. A person whose economic situation has recently changed may, for example, be waiting for an appointment to claim a benefit.
The pre-benefit income and/or the estimated size of a benefit have shown to be strongly related to the probability of take-up (see e.g. Kayser and Frick, 2001; Riphahn, 2001; Blank and Ruggles, 1996; Blundell et al., 1988; Anderson and Meyer, 1997; DWP, 2002) . This relation is expected: it is obvious that the expected size of the economic gain is likely to be an important influence on the take-up decision. Results from Anderson and Meyer (1997) indicate that not only the short-term benefit but also the expected duration of benefit recipiency is of importance: in a sample of individuals not taking up Unemployment
Insurance in the US, 37 per cent claimed that they did not do so because their expected benefit duration was too short.
As regards level of education, some have found a negative relation to take-up (Blank and Ruggles, 1996; Riphahn, 2001 ) while others have found no significant relation (Kayser and Frick, 2001; Terracol, 2002) . Those who are highly educated are likely to have better future earning opportunities and thus shorter expected benefit durations, which makes them less likely to take up a benefit. However, people with higher education are also likely to have better knowledge about the bureaucratic system and where to obtain necessary information, making their transaction costs lower.
The results regarding family types are inconclusive. Single parents were found to have the highest take-up rate of all family types of AFDC in the US by Blank and Ruggles (1996) ; and of Sozialhilfe in Germany by Riphahn (2001) but not by Kayser and Frick (2001) . Partnered parents may expect shorter spells of recipiency because, with the earning potential of two adults in the household, the long-term economic incentives could be smaller for this group, 8 leading to a lower take-up. The number of children, at least young children, has been reported to increase the take-up propensity (Kayser and Frick, 2001; Blank and Ruggles, 1996; Terracol, 2002; Riphahn, 2001) , which is likely to be explained by an increase in the perceived need of the benefit when the well-being of children is considered.
It is plausible that transaction costs are higher for newly arrived immigrants. However, no study, as far as I know, has found significant differences in take-up between immigrants and natives when other socio-demographic factors are controlled for (see e.g. Bird et al.,1999) .
For race, Blank and Ruggles (1996) found that non-white women were more likely to take up AFDC in the US, controlling for factors such as age, education and family status. It is possible that non-white women expect fewer labour market opportunities and thus longer benefit durations.
Riphahn (2001) reported that home ownership was negatively related to take-up of Sozialhilfe in Germany, and Blundell et al. (1988) similarly found that tenants in public housing had higher propensity than people in other tenure types of take-up of Housing Benefit in Britain.
Riphahn (2001) and Kayser and Frick (2001) found that residents in metropolitan areas had a higher probability of take-up of Sozialhilfe than others in Germany. In a large city, stigma can be lower because of the higher degree of anonymity. The geographic distance to welfare agencies can also be expected to be generally lower in more densely populated areas, thus lowering the transaction costs of travelling to the agency.
The relation between age and the propensity to take up a benefit must naturally depend on the nature of the benefit. In cases where the benefit in question is equally accessible to all age groups, younger people have been shown to have higher take-up rates (e.g. Blank and Ruggles, 1996; Riphahn, 2001) . This is often interpreted as a result of a weaker work-norm among young people.
Many of the effects described above may also be partially explained by group-specific norms.
If welfare recipiency is common in a group, and if people within that group identify and interact more with each other than with others, the norms against it can weaken and the propensity to claim a benefit should increase. So may, for example, the norms against benefit recipiency be stronger for people with higher education, because benefit recipiency is likely to be less common among those that highly educated people relate to. Similar processes may partly explain the effects found for factors such as age, single parenthood or race.
Some studies have put group-specific norms into focus and explicitly considered contextual effects, that is, whether the propensity to claim a benefit is affected by the frequency of benefit recipiency in some context to which the individual belongs (e.g. a geographical area or a language group). The study of such effects requires high-quality data and strict controls to avoid selection biases. After extensive controls, significant effects of the benefit recipiency of others on an individual's benefit take-up have been found by Bertrand et al. (2000) for the US.; Terracol (2002) for France; and Mood (2004) for Sweden. Such effects are probably mainly reflections of the perceived stigma. The norms attached to a behaviour are largely dependent on the perceived normality of the behaviour, which in turn is dependent on the number of people exhibiting the behaviour (see Hedström, 1998; Cialdini, 1984; Kuran, 1995) . For benefit recipiency, this implies that an increase in aggregate recipiency is likely to reduce the stigma associated with it, and thereby increase the propensity of other individuals to claim benefits. Others' benefit recipiency is, however, also likely to affect an individual's knowledge about different benefits, because information about benefits may spread through personal contacts. Thus, the greater the number of individuals who receive benefits, the greater the probability that other individuals will learn about these benefits' existence and their entitlement rules.
THE AUSTRALIAN WELFARE STATE AND TAKE-UP
Australia probably has the most selective welfare system of all western countries. Virtually all benefits are means-tested and funded by general taxation. In Esping-Andersen's classical categorisation of different welfare regimes (1990), Australia is, together with the US and Canada, classified as an 'archetypical example' of a liberal welfare state, where benefits 'cater mainly to a clientele of low-income, usually working-class, state dependants', and 'the progress of social reform has been severely circumscribed by traditional, liberal work-ethic norms […] entitlement rules are strict and often associated with stigma; benefits are typically modest' (Esping-Andersen 1990: 26) . This welfare state regime is contrasted with the social democratic and conservative welfare regimes.
Though highly influential, Esping-Andersen's categorisation has not gone unchallenged. Castles and Mitchell (1993) argue that the Australian welfare state is inherently different from other liberal welfare states and that it was created 'by other means' than those utilized in Europe, basically through providing a large part of welfare through the labour market (e.g.
through minimum wage restrictions) instead of through the state. Furthermore, several
Australian means-tested benefits have not primarily been focused on the very poor, but have been designed to exclude those with the highest incomes. Because many benefits are meanstested but not residual, Castles and Mitchell (see also Castles, 1985) argue that few people see it as degrading to be a welfare beneficiary. In his more recent work, however, Castles concludes that the Australian welfare state has changed under the two last governments, and that more stringent eligibility criteria for benefits has resulted in a punitive and stigmatising welfare regime more along the lines of Esping-Andersen's traditional description (Castles, 2001 ).
Because there are many different benefits in Australia, often with complex eligibility rules, more knowledge and effort are required from the applicant in order to claim them, and so transaction costs are likely to be high. Saunders (1991) notes that the eligibility criteria and the administrative procedures of means testing changed to become more stringent under the Hawke government's efforts to increase targeting. These changes, he argues, may have deterred people from claiming benefits because of the increases in hassle and loss of integrity for claimants.
Means-tested benefits in Australia are gradually reduced with increasing incomes by taper rates less than one. For several benefits, this means that they target a large fraction of the population, but entitlements are often rather small. Under-utilisation of these benefits could be partly a result of weak economic incentives. Of course, this feature of the benefits is also likely to make them less stigmatising: if rather well-off people receive the same type of benefits as poorer people, it is less likely that these benefits will become associated with certain negatively valuated groups.
In line with Esping-Andersen's view, the traditional preconception is that the more selective benefits are, the higher the stigma associated with them will be (see Corden, 1995) . It is important to bear in mind, though, that the stigma associated with a benefit may not only be an effect of how selective a particular benefit is, but also of its position in a larger welfare state context. This interaction may take different forms. On the one hand, a welfare state regime is to some degree a codification of certain normative views. A highly selective welfare state (such as the Australian one) is based on, in Esping-Andersen's words, 'traditional liberal work ethic norms'. Insofar as these norms mirror the view of the population, the stigma against recipiency of any means-tested benefit should be higher than in less selective welfare states. On the other hand, as Castles points out, if almost all benefits are means-tested, recipiency of such benefits becomes more normal and hence no benefit is singled out as particularly stigmatising. In a welfare state where most poverty is eliminated by universal transfers, few people receive means-tested transfers, and recipiency of such benefits is seen as less normal. This means that a selective benefit can be highly stigmatising in an otherwise universal welfare system but not in a predominantly selective system.
To sum up, previous research and knowledge about the Australian welfare state does not provide any clear-cut hypotheses about the extent and determinants of take-up in Australia.
The complexity of the benefit system points towards high transaction costs, and the fact that many people are entitled to rather small amounts means that many eligible people have little economic incentive to claim benefits. Regarding the strength of norms against welfare use, theories point in diverging directions and the status is therefore unclear.
DATA AND DESIGN OF THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
For the empirical analyses I use the first two waves of the Household, Income and Labour The information given by respondents is about incomes before any tax is subtracted.
Centrelink, the government agency that administers benefit means-tests and payments in Australia, normally pays benefits fortnightly. Therefore, the incomes reported for the time preceding the interview are likely to be a good approximation of the incomes that Centrelink assesses when judging a person's eligibility. Only information on wage/salary income and benefit income is given for the time immediately preceding the interview, so any additional incomes that are assessable are estimated here from the information on such incomes for the financial year. The resulting income measure is thus a fortnightly sum of the estimated earnings (based on current income), and the estimated business incomes, investment incomes, private pensions and regular private transfers (based on financial year income). Unless otherwise stated, income, eligibility and take-up here refer to or are based on this income measure because it is likely to best reflect the income that authorities use to determine eligibility.
Centrelink assesses most financial and non-financial assets of the individual's household in determining eligibility, the most important exceptions being the value of the primary home and superannuation of non-retirees. Centrelink values assets at their market value less any debts for them. Individuals in households with assets above a maximum limit are normally not eligible for a benefit. As is the case with incomes, the maximum limit varies with household characteristics (see appendix 
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We can see from Table 1 It has been reported that other Australian surveys understate incomes from benefits (Siminski et al. 2003) . If benefit recipiency is understated in HILDA, and if this is due to selective misreporting by respondents (i.e. recipients do not report recipiency to the interviewers), takeup is likely to be underestimated. However, a lower benefit recipiency rate in a sample than in the population does not necessarily reflect misreporting. It can also be due to a higher nonresponse rate among poorer households, where benefit recipiency is more common. As long as poor non-recipients and recipients of benefits are equally likely not to participate in the interview, this problem will not lead to a bias of estimated take-up rates.
I have compared the estimates of recipiency at the time of the interview from HILDA 2001
with FaCS official numbers for June 2001 4 (FaCS, 2003) , and there is a very good correspondence for the total number of recipients of any of the benefits in Table I . The HILDA estimate is actually slightly higher than the FaCS numbers (with a coverage rate 5 of 1.05). Recipiency of some benefits is understated, while it is overstated for others. The greatest underestimation is for Newstart, where FaCS reports that 3.6 per cent of the population aged 15 or over receives the benefit, as compared to the HILDA estimate of 2.7
per cent (a coverage rate of 0.76). In general, the unweighted estimates of recipiency in HILDA yield a higher benefit rate than the weighted estimates. The fact that the overall estimates are highly accurate while the estimates for some specific programs are not may be due to recipients not always knowing which benefit they receive.
USAGE OF MEANS-TESTED BENEFITS AMONG THE POOREST
In this section I examine the take-up of any of the benefits in Table I above. Four criteria define the population to be studied: (1) their assessable household income, equalized for household size 6 , is below half the median income in the HILDA sample, (2) their assessable household assets are below the maximum amount allowed for recipiency of a benefit (including this criterion means that we can only use observations from 2002) 7 , (3) the respondent has lived in Australia for at least ten years (this is a criterion for some of the included benefits, but applying it makes a very small difference in the results) and (4) the respondent is not a dependent member of a household.
Having an income below half the median income is a rather low cut-off point. 8 This means that many eligible individuals will not be included in this analysis, but that those who are included are very likely to be eligible, so this should lead to conservative estimates of nontake-up. Poor people should be eligible for some means-tested benefit, but of course some may not qualify because of failure to live up to certain conditions, for example job search requirements. To the extent that this is the case, the estimate of non-take-up among people with low incomes will be inflated. However, the actual non-take-up among all eligible individuals is likely to be higher than this estimate, because people with higher incomes and thus lower entitlements are less likely to claim benefits. Table 2 shows the estimated take-up in this sub-sample in 2002. Under the assumption that all those below the income-and assets-limits used here are eligible for a benefit, the take-up is 84.6 per cent. The results indicate further that poor people of Age Pension (AP) age 9 are highly likely to receive the benefits they are entitled to: considering the likelihood of some frictional non-take-up, their estimated take-up rate is as good as full (94.1 per cent for women and 98.2 per cent for men). For those under AP age, the corresponding figures are clearly lower at 80.2 (women) and 72.4 (men) per cent. This could of course be due to a higher fraction of the younger respondents not being eligible for benefits in spite of low incomes, but also to a higher non-take-up of benefits normally given to younger people. It is also interesting to note that women under age pension age take up benefits to a higher degree than men, whereas the opposite holds for those of age pension age 10 It has been reported that incomes for self-employed people are less reliable than for wage earners (see e.g. Bradbury, 1997) . This means that the self-employed may actually have a living standard higher than their incomes indicate. When respondents who are self-employed in an incorporated or unincorporated business, or who have a partner who is, are excluded from the analyses, the estimated take-up rate amounts to 87.3 per cent. As expected, take-up rates are inversely related to assets and incomes: in the 'poorest' subsample, with fortnightly household incomes under 300 Australian dollars 11 and assets below 10 000 dollars, estimated take-up is 91.5 per cent.
The results in this section indicate that a large majority of those with very low incomes receive means-tested benefits. It must be kept in mind, however, that the take-up among all who are eligible is likely to be lower than in this very poor sub-sample.
THE TAKE-UP OF PARENTING PAYMENT
Parenting Payment (PP) is one of several means-tested benefits administered by Centrelink that aims at helping needy families with the costs of raising children. To be entitled to PP, one has to have at least one dependent child (not necessarily biological) under the age of 16. As a general rule, the applicant must have been an Australian resident for two years to be eligible (some exceptions exist). PP can be given to partnered as well as single parents, but only to one member of a couple. For the years studied in this paper ( 
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I estimate the take-up rate by assessing how many of those regarded as eligible who were receiving PP at the time of the interview. In the first row of Table 3 , we can see that 71.1 per cent of those with estimated eligibility in 2002 did receive PP. 13 There is also a clear indication of take-up being much lower among partnered mothers than among single mothers -the difference in estimated take-up rates is almost 30 percentage points. To assess the sensitivity of the take-up estimate, Table 3 respondents who in fact receive it. In many cases, this is likely to be due to benefit confusion, 20 that is, respondents do not know which benefit they receive from Centrelink (recall that the overall rate of income support recipiency is not understated in HILDA). Those who report recipiency of another benefit are not considered eligible here (see note 12), so no bias will result from such confusion. The underestimation can also partially be a result of systematic non-participation in HILDA by those eligible for PP -this would bias estimates of take-up only if eligible recipients were less likely to participate than eligible non-recipients. Even under the most restrictive -and highly unrealistic -assumption that the discrepancy is exclusively due to recipients of PP not reporting recipiency of any benefit, estimated nontake-up is non-negligible at 18.5 per cent.
Multivariate analysis: Who takes up benefits and who does not?
Which factors increase the propensity of claiming PP among eligible women? Is there any category where take-up is particularly low? In Table 4 , I summarise the mechanisms through which variables included in the multivariate analysis are likely to affect take-up (when other included variables are held constant). The variables will be described in detail below. The mechanisms indicated in the table are most likely not the only ones operating, but they are the ones that I believe to be most important considering the previous theoretical discussion and findings from other countries. I also include in the analyses some variables for which the theoretical link to take-up is unclear: namely, age, whether one owns the primary home, selfemployment status and whether one is aboriginal or a Torres Strait Islander. Table 4 . Plausible effects of variables on the components of the take-up decision. 
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Benefit recipiency in the respondent's CD gives the proportion of recipients of any of the means-tested benefits listed in Table I, 
Results
Because the outcome variable is dichotomous I use logit regression. 18 I estimate four different models. In the first model I include all variables described above except entitlement, windfall income and the variable measuring benefit recipiency in the CD. In the second model I add the entitlement and the windfall income variables, and in the third the contextual variable. The fourth model is identical to the third model, but assets are here included in the eligibility estimation. Only observations from the 2002 survey with non-missing information on all asset variables can be used in this model, which leads to a large reduction in sample size.
In models 1-3, I pool observations from 2001 and 2002. To eliminate potential bias resulting from the dependency of observations for the same individual, standard errors are corrected for this clustering. Probability weights (as described above) are used in all models. A dummy that indicates year of observation is included to eliminate dependency between observations within a year. In the estimation of contextual effects in model 3, I include only those 23 observations where there were 15 respondents or more in the CD, because rates based on small numbers are less reliable. All models are presented in Table 5. 19 Results in models 1-3 corroborate the finding that single parents have a clearly higher probability of take-up of PP as compared to partnered parents. Take-up is also significantly lower for foreign-born than for Australian-born mothers; lower for those living outside the major cities; and lower for mothers with an advanced diploma or higher education than for those with lower education. We can also see that a mother in a household where someone is self-employed or where they own the home is less likely to take up PP. None of these differences is explained by the size of entitlements, but the lower take-up of those with high education seems to be partly an effect of their living in areas where benefit recipiency is less common. Entitlements are, as expected, positively related to take-up. Aboriginal mothers have a higher take-up rate than non-aboriginal mothers in the sample, but the difference between the groups is at no stage significant. Neither are the effects of number of children, windfall income and age.
The relation between benefit recipiency in the CD and take-up is positive, as expected. The effect of this variable may partly reflect the effect of the socio-economic composition of the CD in a broader respect: areas with high benefit recipiency may be areas where other behaviours or characteristics are more common, so it may not be just the benefit recipiency but other behaviours and characteristics of other people in the CD that affect the propensity of an individual to take up a benefit. This would, however, also be an effect of the context upon the individual. The risk of selection effects biasing the coefficient for this variable upwards is probably small due to the large number of socio-demographic controls.
In model 4, assets are taken into account in the eligibility estimation. The sample is thereby much reduced and it is harder to obtain significant results. Several point estimates change substantially, but most maintain their direction and, roughly, their relative size. To see if the changes between models 3 and 4 are due to the change of the definition of eligibility or to the smaller sample not being a random representation of the sample in earlier models, one model
(not shown) was tested where eligibility was defined as in earlier models (i.e. it did not include assets), but the sample was the same as in model 4 (i.e. only respondents from 2002
with non-missing information on assets). This analysis shows that not including assets in models 1-3 did not bias the results.
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To facilitate substantive interpretations of the results, we can compare the predicted probabilities of take-up for individuals differing in some characteristic while other variables in the model are held constant. For values of a variable X 1 , the probability of take-up for individual i (P i ) is estimated as:
where: b 1 is the estimated coefficient for X 1 from the logit regression, (X k ) constant values of the other independent variables, and b k are the coefficients of these variables.
In Figures 1 and 2 I graph the predicted probability of take-up, based on estimates in model 3, for different levels of entitlement and contextual benefit recipiency. 21 The three vertical lines indicate the average value of the independent variable and one standard deviation's distance from it in both directions. .7
.8
.9
Probability of take-up 0 100 200 300 400
Entitlement
Figure 2 Predicted probability of take-up at different levels of CD benefit recipiency .4
.5
.6
.7
Probability of take-up 0 20 40 60 80
Percentage benefit recipients in CD Figures 1 and 2 show that the size of entitlement and the level of contextual benefit recipiency are both associated with substantial increases in the take-up probability. 22 For contextual benefit recipiency, the relation is slightly non-linear, indicating a stronger increase in take-up propensity at lower levels of CD benefit recipiency.
To further our understanding of the relative importance of the significant variables in Table 5, model 3, Table 6 shows how the predicted probability of take-up changes in each of these when other variables in the model are held constant. The table shows how the predicted probability of take-up changes in each of the significant variables in model 3, and takes as its point of departure a partnered woman 35 years of age, Australian-born, non-aboriginal, with one child, an entitlement of 301 AUD, education lower than advanced diploma, living in a major city, home-owner, with no self-employed person in the household and with CD benefit 27 recipiency at 28 per cent. For entitlement and contextual benefit recipiency, the take-up is reported for levels at one standard deviation below and above the average. The estimated effects of single parenthood, self-employment, immigration and remoteness of area are quite strong, corresponding to differences of 13 to 23 percentage units in take-up. A standard deviation's change in entitlement or contextual benefit recipiency or a difference in education level or tenure has an average effect on take-up of 6 to 10 percentage units.
The results of the multivariate analysis confirm that the size of economic incentives is important: the take-up probability increases with entitlement. The access to alternative economic help, as measured by windfall income, and the number of children should both affect the perceived need of money. Surprisingly, neither of them is significantly related to take-up. Some results point towards the importance of transaction costs: take-up is clearly lower among people outside the major cities and among immigrants. For the self-employed, part of the explanation of the low take-up is probably that the actual living standard in these households is not properly reflected in their reported incomes. However, their low take-up may also be caused by higher transaction costs, because their income reporting to Centrelink is likely to be more demanding. It may also be harder for this group to calculate their potential eligibility: if they feel a high degree of insecurity as to whether they are entitled to PP, they may feel less inclined to invest time and effort in claiming it.
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The effect of benefit recipiency in the CD is consistently significant, which points towards stigma as one important deterrent to take-up. Though this effect may be caused by other social influence mechanisms, stigma is likely to play an important role. Of course, geographical proximity is not the only characteristic increasing the propensity of identification and interaction with others. If individuals identify or interact more with people who are similar to them in some respect, their behaviour, knowledge and attitudes will be more affected by these people than by others. Thus the behaviour of people with this shared characteristic will be more similar than it would be for exogenous reasons alone.
Highly educated people have a lower take-up propensity than lower educated people, in spite of their transaction costs probably being lower. This result is more likely due to their shorter expected benefit durations and/or the stigma mechanism mentioned above: if highly educated people tend to interact and identify with non-recipients, the social and personal costs of claiming the benefits they are entitled to are likely to be higher than for those who interact and identify more with recipients. The drop of the effect of the education variable when controls for benefit recipiency in the CD are added suggests a relation of this kind: highly educated people tend to have lower take-up partly because they live in areas where there are few benefit recipients.
Such stigma mechanisms may also be part of the explanation of the differences between partnered and single mothers: if a single mother identifies with other single mothers, and their benefit recipiency is high, the stigma she feels about claiming PP should be less than it would be for a partnered mother. Similarly, if a single mother frequently interacts with other single mothers, she may be better informed about her potential eligibility and the application procedure. For these and other categories where processes of this kind may operate, differences between groups that were initially exogenously caused can be endogenously reinforced and strengthened.
CONCLUSIONS
For a welfare system to be efficient, benefits must reach the people they are designed for. This is a potential problem when benefits are selective, because the initiative of claiming a benefit must then be taken by the needy individual. Australia is a highly selective welfare state, but in spite of this, non-take-up has not been much discussed or studied. In this paper, I have analysed data from the two first waves of HILDA in an attempt to further the understanding of non-take-up in Australia.
The discussion of theories and previous research about non-take-up, and consideration of the Australian conditions, did not result in any clear-cut hypotheses regarding the extent of takeup. Some theories and facts point towards a high take-up in Australia, while others seem to imply a low one. The empirical results give a somewhat mixed picture: non-take-up seems to be considerable in some population categories, while it is low in others. Low income earners of retirement age appear to be efficiently targeted with means-tested benefits, whereas 20 to 28 per cent of those with equally low incomes below Age Pension age do not receive any income support benefits. On average, almost 85 per cent of the poor receive some income support benefit. This is a high take-up rate by international standards, but we must remember that it is not an estimate of take-up among all who are eligible, but only among the poorest.
Take-up should be lower when all who are eligible are considered.
The main difficulty in studying take-up lies in the estimation of eligibility. For a detailed analysis of take-up, I therefore focused on Parenting Payment (PP), a benefit for which the eligibility criteria could be well captured by information in HILDA. The estimated take-up of PP is 71 per cent, but it is far less common among partnered parents, even when the size of entitlement is accounted for. The results of the multivariate analysis also show clearly lower take-up in those categories where transaction costs are likely to be high (immigrants and those living outside the major cities), and increasing take-up with increased size of entitlement and benefit recipiency in the CD.
Contrary to the traditional conception of selective welfare states as highly stigmatising, this paper gives no evidence of an exceptionally low degree of take-up in Australia, at least not 30 among the poorest and among those eligible for PP. The relatively high take-up rates found in my analyses appear to compare better to those found in countries such as the US and UK than to the very low ones found in the Scandinavian countries. Still, these results show that more than marginal non-take-up exists in some groups, and in the case of PP, that the balance between potential economic benefits on the one hand and transaction and stigma costs on the other are crucial for understanding the extent to which individuals utilize the benefits they are entitled to.
APPENDIX: ESTIMATION OF ELIGIBILITY AND ENTITLEMENT
Details about eligibility and entitlements for benefits can be found in FaCS (2004) or Centrelink (2001; . Eligibility and entitlements are based on various criteria apart from income and assets. All major sources of income except other income support benefits are assessed. A range of marginal types of incomes, that is, windfall incomes like inheritances, redundancy payments or gifts; payments for work-related expenses or payments from natural disasters trust funds are exempt from assessment. Centrelink values most financial and nonfinancial assets of the individual's household, the most important exceptions being the value of the primary home and superannuation of non-retirees. Non-financial assets are valued at their market value less any debts.
Note: all monetary sums are expressed in Australian dollars.
In this paper:
A. The estimation of assessable income is given by: 
